Already moved to Tortuga!
This one is probably close behind!
General question for those that know law...isn’t there settled case law on a “duty to protect” in regards to police...i.e. there being none? If so, I’m guessing that’s his defense for the majority of charges? I’m guessing they’ll get him on the “lying to investigators” charge though.
1. I OCR'd an old PDF (attached) to get this so please excuse what appear to be typos.
2. Again, this came from an old document so I do not know if any of the links are still good, but you can search the case name and you will find them.
3. Can we really legislate bravery, or more to the point, legislate against any cowardice, real or perceived?
Enjoy!
This makes it very clear -the burden to defend and or use deadly force, is a RIGHT that lies with you personally to ACT accordingly and appropriately should you fear for your life and/or limb.
Affirmative duty to protect Cf. Reciprocal obligations; South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (How) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856) (the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that local law-enforcement had no duty to protect individuals, but only a general duty to enforce the laws );
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct 998, 1989 (1989) (There is no merit to petitioner's contention that the State's knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger established a "special relationship" giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect While certain "special relationships" created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process (489 U.S. 189, 190] Clause, to provide adequate protection, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty);
http://laws findlaw>com/us/489/189.html
Bowers v. Devito, 686 E2d 616 (7th Cir 1982) (There is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let the people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order); (No duty to protect)= Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss;Cf. Reciprocial obligations;
Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981) (Official police personnel and the government employing them are not generally liable to victims of criminal acts for failure to provide adequate police protection ... this uniformly accepted rule rests upon the fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular citizen . .. a publicly maintained police force constitutes a basic governmental service provided to benefit the community at large by promoting public peace, safety and good order.); htt//forums.philos
Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 CaLApp 3d 6, 120 CaLRptr 5 (1975) (The administrator of the estate of Ruth Bunnell who had been killed by her estranged husband brought a wrongful death action against the city whose police department refused to respond to her call for protection some 45 minutes before her death. Mrs. Bunnell had called the police to report that Mack Bunnell had called saying he was on his way to her home to kill her She was told to call back when Mack Bunnell arrived. The police had responded 20 times to her calls in the past year, and on one occasion, arrested her estranged husband for assaulting her. The Court of Appeal held that the police department and its employees enjoyed absolute immunity for failure to provide sufficient police protection. The allegations that the police had responded 20 times to her calls did not indicate that the police department had assumed any special relationship or duty toward her such as would remove itsimmunity.); http //www copcrimes com/brophy.artler
Davidson v. City of Westminister, 32 CaL3d 197, 185 CaLRptr 252 (1982) (A husband and wife who were assaulted in a laundromat while the assailant was under survillance by officers, brought legal action against the city and the officers for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and for negligent investigation, failure to protect and failure to warn. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the mere fact that the officers had previously recognized the assailant from a distance as a potential assailant because of his resemblance to a person suspected of perpetrating a prior assault did not establish a "special relationship" between officers and assailant under which a duty would be imposed on officers to control assailant's conduct; (2) factors consisting of office's prior recognition of assailant as likely perpetrator of previous assault and officer's surveillance of assailant in laundromat in which victim was present did not give rise to special relationship between officers and victim so as to impose duty on officers to protect victim from assailant; and (3) victim could not maintain cause of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, in view of fact that it was not alleged that officers failed to act for the purpose of causing emotional injury, and that in the absence of such an intent to injure, officer's inaction was not extreme or outrageous conduct); http:/wwcopcrimes.com /brophy htm#Harler
Westbrooks v. State, 173 Ca1App3d 1203, 219 CaLRtr 674 (1985) (The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his effort to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1 52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5 45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.);
http://ww.copcrimes.com/rophyhtmHartler
Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal.App 2d 131, 43 CaLRptr 294 (1965) (In an action against police officers and city for personal injuries sustained by Kathryne Ne Casek when she was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody)
http://www.copcrimes.com/brophy.htm#hartzler
Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et aL, 269 CaLApp 2d 803, 75 CaLRptr 240 (1969) (An action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the Watts'Riots' of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.);
http://ww.copcrimes.com/rophyhtmHartler
Antique Arts Corpv. City of Torrence, 39 Ca1App.3d 588, 114 CaLRptr. 332 (1974) (A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m and the alert message was relayed to the police department
The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 pm , and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient. "The statutory scheme makes it clear that failure to provide adequate police protection will not result in governmental liability, nor will a public entity be liable for failure to arrest a person who is violating the law. The statutory scheme shows legislative intent to immunize the police function from tort liability from the inception of its exercise to the point of arrest, regardless of whether the action be labeled discretionary or ministerial'"); http //wwwcopcrimes.com/br
